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With one in 100 adult Americans behind bars, and prison budgets
consuming an increasing share of state budgets, few social policy issues
compare in significance to the debate over which criminal offenders should
be incarcerated and for how long. David Abrams' article, The Impriasoner's
Dilemma: A Cost-Benefit Approach to Incarceration,' makes an important
contribution to that debate, offering an economic approach to assessing the
net benefits of holding or freeing prisoners on the incarceration margin. In
this short Response, I first highlight several strengths of Abrams' piece and
discuss the possible case that could be made for incorporating formal
cost-benefit analysis ("CBA") as a routine part of criminal justice
policymaking, as well as some potential objections. Second, I offer more
specific critical comments focused on Abrams' analysis of the costs of
incarceration, which I find to be less fully developed than his discussion of
its benefits. Finally, I close with some brief thoughts on an issue Abrams
makes a point of leaving open: the role that retributive justice concerns
should play in an analysis of incarceration's costs and benefits.

*
Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks very much to Nick
Bagley and John Bronsteen for helpful comments.
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David S. Abrams, The Imprisoner's Dilemma: A Cost-Benefit Approach to Incarceration,98
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ABRAMS' CONTRIBUTION: CAN FORMAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IMPROVE
CRIMINALJUSTICE POLICY?

Abrams' task is a Herculean (indeed, arguably Sisyphean) one, in that it
requires each of the major utilitarian costs and benefits of incarceration to
be quantified in dollars. Incarceration affects society in many complex ways,
so although the overall approach is straightforward, the underlying
estimation tasks are daunting. One could write a long article, or many,
disputing the methods of the various studies Abrams cites and the values
that should be given to the key terms in his equations. But the merits of
Abrams' article are neither strictly wedded to those of any particular
empirical estimate of each term, nor to the specific conclusions he reaches
based on his preferred estimates. Rather, the piece sets forth a general
method of analysis, identifies the information policymakers need in order to
answer incarceration policy questions, provides guidance for how to sift
through the thousands of relevant studies and look for the most rigorous
methods, and highlights a few particularly well-designed studies on each key
point.
Abrams is not the first to suggest that the costs and benefits of
incarceration should be weighed against one another. Variations on CBA of
criminal punishment go at least as far back as Jeremy Bentham. But Abrams
brings to the table a firm grounding in the relevant empirical literature and
an exacting critical take on its methods. He is especially adept at explaining
why the causal identification methods used in some studies are more
credible than those of others, an important lesson for policymakers, who
might otherwise too readily assume that all empirical estimates are created
equal. Abrams appropriately emphasizes studies that use quasi-experimental
methods-for instance, randomization of judge or counsel assignments as
an instrument for sentence length. Such studies are designed to respond to
the problem of omitted variables bias, which is often a serious concern in
studies relying on regression methods that depend on being able to observe
and control for relevant confounding variables. Ultimately, Abrams
concedes that there remains much empirical work to be done and predicts
that the CBA method he outlines will increase in practical usefulness as the
underlying research improves.
Abrams' contribution is also timely: state legislatures, courts, and
corrections departments have begun to seriously consider the question of
how to reduce prison costs and overcrowding without compromising public
safety.2 The existing research on that question has mainly focused on the
problem of identifying the individual prisoners who pose the least risk of

2.

E.g., NGA CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES, ISSUE BRIEF, STATE EFFORTS IN SENTENCING AND

CORRECTIONS

REFORM (2011), available at http://www.asca.net/system/assets/attachments/
3702/11 ioSENTENCINGREFORM.pdf (reviewing recent state initiatives).
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recidivism, taking the need to limit prison populations as a given.3 Abrams
addresses instead the first-order question of how many people to incarcerate
in the first place.
In some ways, it is surprising that formal economic analysis like Abrams'
is not already common in criminal justice policymaking. Non-criminal
regulatory decisions are routinely subjected to formal CBA, often carried out
by government by requirement of law.4 This is so even though they often
involve quantification questions that are similarly challenging-for instance,
estimating society's willingness to pay for particular environmental benefits,
or the climate benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions: Moreover,
regulatory CBA typically also requires the relative merits of alternatives to the
proposed regulation to be assessed.6 Regulatory CBA is now a wellestablished feature of the administrative state, and it is perhaps curious that
nothing like it has ever been incorporated into the carceral state.
Incarceration, after all, is one of the most profound exercises of state
authority.
Imagine, then, that a similar CBA requirement applied when the state
adopted rules expanding the incarceration of its citizens. Too often in
recent decades, legislatures have adopted policies that increase
incarceration
(such as mandatory sentencing laws, new criminal
prohibitions, or "truth in sentencing" laws that curtail parole) without any
serious critical assessment of those policies' costs or the availability of
effective but less costly alternative crime prevention strategies.7 If legislatures

3.
For brief reviews of the criminological literature and policy recommendations, see
Jordan M. Hyatt, Mark H. Bergstrom & Steven L. Chanenson, Follow the Evidence: Integrate Risk
Assessment into Sentencing, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 266 (2oi ); Michael A. Wolff, Evidence-BasedJudicial
Discretion: PromotingPublic Safety Through State Sentencing Reform, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1389, 1405-09
(2oo8). I have critiqued the current risk-prediction instruments used by some state courts on the
basis that their practice of basing punishment on group membership promotes disparity and is
likely unconstitutional. See Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalizationof
Discrimination, STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming); available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract-id=231894O##.
4. For examples at the federal level, see Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94
Stat. 1164 (1980) (specifically requiring assessment of the effect of regulations on small
businesses); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993); Office of Mgmt. &
Budget, Circular A-4 (Sept. 17, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/omb/assets/omb/circulars/aoo4/a- 4 .pdf.
See generally Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posrier, Climate Regulation and the Limits of
5.
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1557 (201) (describing and critiquing efforts to
monetize climate change effects).
6.

7.

See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, § i(b)( 3 ), 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,736.

See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, 11 FED. SENT'G REP. i8o,
184 (1999) (quoting a speech by Chief Justice Rehriquist and stating that "mandatory
minimums are generally not the product of careful deliberation . . . [and] 'are frequently the
result of floor amendments to demonstrate emphatically that legislators want to get tough on
crime"' (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mary Price, Everything Old Is New Again: Fixing
Sentencing by Going Back to First Principles,36 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 75, 8o
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or sentencing commissions were required by state law, or otherwise chose, to
engage in an Abrams-style CBA before adopting changes to sentencing law
or policy that would expand incarceration, it might force such critical
assessment, and perhaps spur research that helps to fill gaps in existing
knowledge. If so, it could substantially improve the decision-making
process-even if the CBA is crude and the "right" estimate of net benefits
remains elusive.
I am assuming here that CBA would operate principally as a constraint
on the growth of the carceral state. Abrams does not make such an
assumption; he applies his analysis evenhandedly to both cuts and
expansions. Still, in practice I suspect that if rigorous CBA were
incorporated routinely to all substantial changes in criminal justice policy,
the effect would probably mainly constrain overzealous expansions, if only
because there are many more expansions to analyze. Although cost pressure
has lately given rise to policy interest in reducing prison populations, for
decades the vast majority of changes to sentencing law and substantive
criminal law have been in the direction of increasing severity-what Bill
Stuntz referred to as a "one-way ratchet" driven by fundamentally
"pathological politics." 8 In any event, one can probably safely assume that
any major policy change that frees prisoners will already be subject to
considerable analysis before passage (although perhaps with less rigor than
Abrams' approach offers). It is increases in severity that, historically, have
often avoided serious debate. Moreover, if one were to seriously consider
imposing requirements of CBA in criminal justice, these one-sided political
pressures could potentially even provide a reason to apply such
requirements only to expansions of incarceration, much as federal law
requires CBA when regulations are to be expanded.9 A one-sided
requirement could also be grounded in the foundational premise of
punishment theory: when the state seeks to impose deliberate harm on an
individual, it must justify it.
However, a CBA requirement (especially a one-sided one) is unlikely to
be adopted for the same political reasons described above, so the idea at this
point is merely a thought experiment. Moreover, it has drawbacks. The
analogy to regulatory CBA, which has been widely criticized, does not
support an overly sanguine view of the potential benefits of CBA in criminal
justice. Abrams does not engage in detail with the regulatory CBA literature;

(2o1o) (noting that the major federal drug mandatory minimums were passed in response to
basketball star Len Bias's death, "in less than one week, without hearings, debate, or study").

8.

WilliamJ. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of CriminalLaw,

too

MICH. L. REV. 505, 505,

509 (2001).

9.
See, e.g., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Circular A-4 , supra note 4, at 6 (explaining "a
presumption against certain types of regulatory action" that requires "a particularly demanding
burden of proof' to overcome). If the politics fundamentally change in the future, then the
political case for a one-sided requirement could disappear.
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it would have been useful to do so, because many of the critiques raised are
equally applicable to the criminal justice context.
One of the most common criticisms concerns the challenges associated
with monetizing the value of non-economic costs and benefits, which is often
carried out via methodologically problematic contingent valuation studies.o
Abrams' CBA monetizes the crime prevention benefits of incarceration
(multiplying all terms on the benefits side by a "cost of crime") as well as the
"value of freedom" on the cost side. He cites differing studies using a variety
of methods of estimating the "cost of crime" (one contingent valuation study
and several that attempt to aggregate concrete costs like lost wages), and
relies on a "revealed preference" measure of the "value of freedom," which I
discuss in more detail in Part III. Abrams acknowledges the challenges of
monetizing these values; in particular, he emphasizes the need for better
research on crime costs. Still, it is probably too optimistic to expect anything
but quite crude and highly contestable monetary valuations of most of the
relevant terms to be available anytime soon; after all, decades in, regulatory
CBA is still struggling with similar valuation problems.
In the regulatory context, some critics have proposed an alternative:
instead of monetization, regulators should assess the net benefits of policies
for human welfare or happiness, relying on recent psychological research on
the determinants of subjective well-being.11 Such an approach could likewise
be applied to the criminal justice context. Indeed, it would be well grounded
in standard utilitarian punishment theory, which requires maximization of
societal happiness. No punishment theory emphasizes maximization of
societal wealth, and a CBA along Abrams' lines can only be reconciled with
utilitarian theory if the monetized values are an effective proxy for happiness
or welfare. But are they? Critics of CBA argue that the amount people pay
for something (much less the amount that they say that they are willing to
pay for it) is often a very poor proxy for the amount that it actually improves

10.
See, e.g., John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being
Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603, 1658-63 (2013); Alexander Volokh,
Rationality or Rationalism? The Positive and Normative Flaws of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 48 HOUS. L.
The contingent valuation, or "willingness-to-pay," approach assesses the
REV. 79, 82-87 (2oi).
cost of a harm based on how much people would pay to avoid it. This amount is in turn
identified in one of two ways: (1) a "revealed preference" approach uses observational data
about the amount people in the real world pay to avoid some risk of the harm; (2) while a
"stated preference" approach relies on survey data that poses hypothetical questions. Both
approaches have been criticized for, among other things, producing estimates that vary wildly
based on small differences in study design. Some scholars have gone further and argued that
monetizing non-monetary costs and benefits is simply theoretically incoherent, involving
comparisons of incommensurable values. E.g., Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the
Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis ofEnvironmentalProtection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1562-70, 15788o (2oo2).
11.

Bronsteen et al., supra note lo, at 1616-45.
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their happiness.12 If so, an approach that simply estimates happiness directly
seems preferable, at least if (and this is a big if) the effects of crime and
incarceration on happiness can be measured more reliably than their
monetary costs.
Abrams does not address the possibility of assessing welfare rather than
economic costs, but in fact, much of his article could helpfully inform such
an analysis. For example, a welfare analysis would certainly take into account
incapacitation and general and specific deterrence effects on crime rates.
The translation of those changes into costs and benefits is what would differ.
The "cost of crime," like the cost to prisoners and the loss to society from
budgetary expenditures on prison, would be estimated in terms of happiness
(or perhaps some other measure of human well-being, such as "life
satisfaction"), rather than dollars.13
Another critique of regulatory CBA focuses on regulators' less-thanrigorous approach to assessing uncertainty and conflict in the underlying
science. For instance, regulators sometimes simply average conflicting
estimates of key terms, an approach that ignores the possibility that some of
the conflicting estimates are presumably wrong.14 Abrams, in contrast,
critically assesses the underlying research, and uses estimates drawn from
specific credible studies to carry out the CBA. Where there are multiple welldesigned studies to choose among, Abrams shows that the CBA can be
repeated using the alternative estimates in order to calculate upper and
lower bounds on the ultimate estimate of net benefits. He illustrates this
point by providing a set of alternate estimates drawing on different studies'
estimates of the cost of crime. Even so, this example only shows what
happens if you vary one of the terms in the model at once (the terms other
than the cost of crime are held constant). One concern is that if one
accounts for conflicting estimates of all the terms at once, the resulting
bounds on the net-benefits estimate might be so wide as to provide little
guidance to policymakers.15

12.

See id. at 1615; Cass R. Sunstein, Willingness to Pay vs. Welfare,

1 HARV.

L. & POLY REV.

303 (2007).
13.
See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Happiness and
Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1046-55 (20o9) (reviewing literature on the hedonic costs
of punishment); Mark A. Cohen, The Effect of Crime on Life Satisfaction, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S325,
S 3 26-29, S 3 4 8- 5 1 (2oo8) (reviewing the literature and finding that overall county crime rates
do not greatly affect life satisfaction, but actual crime victimization does); see also Adam J.
Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, lo9 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 183-86 (2oo9) (arguing
that punishment should account for individual variation in these hedonic costs).
Masur & Posner, supra note 5, at 1580-87; see also Lynn E. Blais, Beyond Cost/Benefit:
14.
The Maturation of Economic Analysis of the Law and Its Consequencesfor Environmental Policymaking,
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 237, 242-43 (critiquing the crudeness of the estimates on which
environmental CBA has relied).
Even as it is, the varying cost-of-crime estimates produce quite large differences in "net
15.
benefits," including variations in sign for four out of six crime categories and order-ofmagnitude differences in magnitude for the others.
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But perhaps narrower bounds would be achievable by reference to
empirical research that is more crime-specific. Because Abrams is outlining a
method of general application in this piece, he uses estimates for "crime"
generally, or for broad categories such as "violent crime." However, provided
on-point empirical research is available, there is no reason his approach
could not be applied in a crime-specific way. After all, legislatures usually
consider sentencing questions in the context of particular crimes. For
instance, if a legislature was considering increasing the penalty for selling
cocaine by one year, it would want to know how cocaine dealers perceive
and respond to sentencing law changes, how much cocaine an average
incarcerated dealer would otherwise have sold on the outside during that
year, what other crimes he would on average have committed, the extent of
substitution by other dealers when one dealer is incarcerated, and so forth.
Of course, this crime-by-crime approach would require specific studies to be
carried out in each context, requiring a substantial investment of social
resources. But this is not very different from the challenges posed by CBA in
the regulatory context, in which regulators assess specific regulations of
specific activities. Moreover, given the large expenses associated with
incarceration, an investment of research resources that allows incarceration
to be used more efficiently might well be cost-justified.
II.

TOWARD A RICHER ACCOUNT OF INCARCERATION'S COSTS

Abrams' objectives go beyond merely introducing a general
cost-benefit approach; he also seeks to identify the best empirical research
to date as to each of the quantities necessary to carry out that analysis. His
assessment of the benefit side of the ledger focuses on three of the most
commonly
cited utilitarian justifications
for punishment-general
deterrence, specific deterrence, and incapacitation-and on estimating the
costs of crime, a key term in estimating the value of each of these crimeprevention benefits.16 It is in this discussion that Abrams' analysis is at its
best, showing a strong command of the literature and providing
characteristically clear explanations of causal identification strategies. By
comparison, Abrams' discussion of the costs of incarceration (a scant six
pages of the paper) seems somewhat half-hearted. Abrams includes just two
terms on the cost side of his calculations: the budgetary costs to the state and
the value of freedom to the prisoner. In this Part, I argue that Abrams'
estimation of both these terms is problematic, and that he also omits other
social costs of incarceration.

16.
A fourth punishment objective, rehabilitation, is briefly discussed as part of the
specific deterrence inquiry. While this may seem odd from a punishment theory perspective, it
is sensible as an empirical matter, because the studies estimating incarceration's net effects on
an individual's subsequent offending cannot disentangle these two causal mechanisms.

104

IOWA LAWREVIEWBULLETIN

[Vol. g8:g7

First, incarceration imposes its most obvious and, in most cases, its most
severe harm on the prisoner himself. From a retributive perspective, one
might wonder whether this harm ought to be considered a "cost," a point I
will return to in Part III. Utilitarian punishment theory, however,
traditionally poses the question whether the social benefits of punishment
are sufficient to justify the suffering imposed on the defendant. Any CBA of
incarceration ought to take quite seriously the empirical question of how to
quantify that suffering.
Unfortunately, the existing empirical research on this question is far
thinner than, for instance, the deterrence literature. This is not Abrams'
fault, and indeed, his own prior study with Christopher Rohlfs'7 provides
one of the only attempts in the empirical literature to answer the question,
and the only one Abrams relies on in The Imprisoner'sDilemma. Because of its
centrality, it merits particular attention. The study uses the Philadelphia Bail
Experiment, which introduced a random source of variation into the setting
of bail amounts (some judges were given guidelines), to assess the effect of
bail amounts on defendants' willingness to post bail and their eventual
return for trial. The study is well conceived and well executed, and provides
persuasive evidence on its central questions of how bail values affect trial
appearance and bail-posting rates. In addition, Abrams argues that the study
should be seen as providing general evidence of the "value of freedom," as
reflected by defendants' willingness to pay for it, and on this point I am less
persuaded. The study provides a start on the question, but taken alone, it is
not enough to persuade me that we have a very good sense of how
policymakers should value incarceration's harm to the individual outside the
bail context.
The estimate of the "value of freedom" that Abrams and Rohlfs provide
is about $1ooo per ninety days for serious offenders, and about $4000 per
ninety days for less serious offenders (a difference they attribute to serious
offenders' low average wages). At the outset, these numbers seem strikingly
low. Can about $1 1 a day, or even about $44 a day for less serious offenders
(which is approximately what a minimum wage worker currently earns in six
hours), really be the weight that policymakers should give to the harm
prison causes the individual? After all, prison does not only involve lost
wages; it is a massive restriction on daily activities, a separation from family
and friends, a harsh physical environment, and prisoners also may
experience loss of subsequent earnings, social stigma, and other
disadvantages upon release.S Abrams says that one can assume that a

See David S. Abrams & Chris Rohlfs, Optimal Bail and the Value of Freedom: Evidence from
17.
the PhiladelphiaBail Experiment, 49 ECON. INQUIRY 750 (201i).
18.
E.g., JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME 3-12 (2003) (surveying
challenges facing ex-prisoners). But see Jeffrey R. Kling, Incarceration Length, Employment and
Earnings, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 863, 864-66, 874-75 (2006) (using random assignment of judges
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"forward-looking offender" would incorporate all such costs into his decision
whether to post bail,19 but if so, the low bail amounts posted might well
suggest that real-world offenders are not, in fact, so forward-looking. The
study finds that offenders are posting amounts that are similar to what would
be their lost wages during the detention period. This in turn implies that the
average offender values all of the other short-term and long-term costs of
prison at zero--or else, more realistically in my view, that something else is
going on.
As to what that something could be, there are several possibilities. One
is simply that criminal defendants are shortsighted and do not, at the
moment of the bail decision, consider all of the costs of incarceration.
Second, the bail-posting decision might be substantially driven by ability to
pay, rather than by willingness to pay. Contingent valuation studies are often
criticized for conflating these concepts. 0 One might especially worry about
this problem in this context; the population in question is largely
impoverished and bail is not a trivial cost. 1 Third, for defendants who are
convicted and sentenced to prison, time spent in pretrial detention is
credited against the prison sentence. Most defendants plead guilty and many
(especially serious offenders) expect incarceration. In theory, though
perhaps not often in practice, serving time immediately could even be more
appealing than waiting until later if the conditions in the local pretrial
detention are better than those expected in prison.2 So bail, for many
defendants, means not precisely buying one's freedom, but borrowing it in
exchange for an equivalent loss of subsequent freedom plus a loan, and
small permanent loss, of money.2 3 This is paying for freedom in a sense, but
it is not entirely obvious that it translates neatly into a contingent-valuation
framework-at least not one that translates into the context of punishment
policy, in which losses of freedom are permanent.
The second term on the cost side of Abrams' ledger is the direct
budgetary cost of imprisonment to the state. Estimating this cost is less
difficult in one sense, because states keep track of expenditures, but Abrams
may actually be overstating the extent to which this budgetary cost should
count as a social cost. As Abrams points out, over 6o% of prison budgets go

as an instrument and finding that among those incarcerated for at least some time, increased
sentence length does not harm subsequent earnings and employment).
19.

2o.

Abrams, supra note 1, at 950-51.
E.g., Sunstein, supranote 12, at 310-11.

2 1. See Laura I. Applemian, justice in the Shadowlands: PretrialDetention, Punishment, & the
Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1306 (2012) (Judges often set money bail at an
amount the defendant cannot afford.").
22.
Pretrial detention is purportedly "noripunitive," and therefore one might expect
superior conditions, although in manyjurisdictions the opposite is true. See id. at igo3-o2.
The money lost permanently is relatively small because bail money itself is mostly a
23.
loan: Abrams and Rohlfs explain in Philadelphia that defendants post io% of the bail amount
and receive 7% back. Abrams & Rohlfs, supra note 17.
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to pay prison employees.24 But money that the state pays to its employees is
not all deadweight loss to society. On the other hand, money spent on
prisons might otherwise be used for more effective forms of economic
stimulus. Society might gain much more if the government employed more
teachers instead of prison guards, for instance. Thus, CBA should include an
estimate of the net social loss or gain relative to whatever the government
would otherwise have spent its money on, drawing on research on the
relative effectiveness of different forms of stimulus.
A larger concern with the cost side of the equation is that it leaves out
the many complex ways in which incarceration affects society beyond its
budgetary cost and its direct effect on the prisoner. These include
consequences for families and broader distortive effects on communities,
which may be especially acute
because mass incarceration
is
demographically and geographically concentrated. Abrams acknowledges
this omission, stating that such costs might include:
promotion of racial stigma, poverty, absent parents, loss of
economic mobility, distorted marriage markets for black women,
detrimental effects on children, and increases in juvenile crime.
These large-scale, societal harms are certainly of a magnitude that
they would significantly impact a cost-benefit analysis. However, in
this Article I confine myself only to the consideration of policy
changes with relatively short-term impacts on incarceration.
Because the policy changes discussed in this Article do not result in
the abolition of the large-scale use of incarceration in society, I
assume that these long-term effects will remain relatively
unchanged.25
This response is unsatisfying. Even though the policy changes Abrams
discusses would not abolish large-scale incarceration, they would affect the
extent of its use, and thus would affect the magnitude of all of the societal
harms he mentions. Abrams recognizes that, for instance, general
deterrence effects depend on the rate at which the government incarcerates
people. It is odd, then, to suggest that effects on families or communities
depend only on the existence of a system of incarceration. All of
incarceration's costs and benefits depend on how many people society
chooses to incarcerate and for how long.
Of course, assigning quantified values to very complicated social
impacts is a very difficult task, but excluding things that are hard to estimate
from a CBA is not a very satisfying answer-it purchases (relative) simplicity
at the cost of accuracy. Moreover, there is considerable research attempting
to quantify these impacts, mostly by criminologists and sociologists, and it

24.
25.

Abrams, supra note i, at 948 fig.6.
Id. at 951 (citation omitted).
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would have been useful for Abrams to offer his critical take on its merits and
suggestions for improving it. I will not attempt to engage in such a review
here, but I offer a couple of thoughts.
First, incarceration's most diffuse social impacts may be particularly
difficult to assess rigorously. For instance, it is not obvious how to interpret a
correlation between a jurisdiction's overall poverty rate and incarcerationit is possible that poverty causes incarceration (instead of, or in addition to,
being caused by it), perhaps by increasing crime, or that both variables are
influenced by other factors like the political environment. Some researchers
sought to address this problem by taking advantage of variations in criminal
justice policy-across time or jurisdictions-to study incarceration's effects,
under the theory that such policies provide an exogenous source of
variation in incarceration rates.26 But here, too, there is some risk of reverse
causation; jurisdictions might adopt policy changes for reasons influenced
by poverty or by unobserved factors correlated to poverty. Another general
concern is that incarceration's social impacts might play out slowly, even
across generations, which makes it harder to interpret relationships between
time trends in incarceration, poverty, and other effects.
But even if the broadest social effects of incarceration are particularly
challenging to assess, its immediate impacts on family members (the subset
of society that one would expect to be most affected) are fairly susceptible to
empirical analysis. The majority of prisoners have minor children, and there
is considerable research on the effect of parental incarceration on children's
poverty, graduation rates, and other outcomes. While these studies generally
find strong relationships, most rely on regression methods that do not
permit omitted variables bias to be ruled out.27 But the effects of parental
incarceration could certainly be subjected to quasi-experimental methods
like those Abrams advocates for assessing incapacitation and specific
deterrence effects: while parental incarceration is obviously not randomly
assigned, it can be influenced by random factors such as assignment of
judges or counsel.28 The principal limitation on such studies is probably data
availability (in particular the ability to link family outcome data to criminal
justice data includingjudge or counsel identifiers).
If family impacts could be quantified, the next step would be to
translate them into social cost measures that are comparable to the other

26. See, e.g., Robert DeFina & Lance Hannon, The Impact ofMass Incarcerationon Poverty, 59
CRIME & DELINQ. 562, 581 (2013) (using instrumental variables including sentencing law
differences in an analysis finding that, had incarceration not quadrupled over the 2o-year study
period, "poverty would have decreased by more than 2o percent, or about 2.8 percentage
points").
See generallyJohn Hagan & Ronit Dinovitzer, Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment for
27.
Children, Communities, and Prisoners,26 CRIME &JUST. 121 (1999) (reviewing the literature).
28.
Cf Kling, supra note 18, at 864-66 (using similar methods to assess effects on
prisoners' post-prison earnings).
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terms in the CBA. For instance, how much does a percentage-point increase
in child poverty cost society? Answering this question is surely no less
complicated than estimating the cost of crime-indeed, one of the social
costs of child poverty may be an increase in crime, so the latter question may
be embedded in the former. Still, this is also a question researchers have
grappled with. For instance, one literature review considered studies of child
poverty's effects on lost subsequent earnings and productivity as adults,
crime, and health, and concluded that in the aggregate, "the costs to
America associated with childhood poverty total $500 billion per year-the
equivalent of nearly 4 percent of GDP."29 About one-third of this estimate
consists of an increase in the social costs of crime-illustrating that
understanding the familial effects of incarceration is important even if one
seeks merely to estimate incarceration's relationship with crime rates, much
less to assess its aggregate social impact.3o
III. WHERE Do RETRIBUTIVEJUSTICE CONCERNS FIT IN?
For readers who think about criminal punishment from a retributive
perspective, Abrams' article may seem to miss the point. If punishment is to
be determined exclusively on the basis of moral desert, then Abrams' CBA
could provide useful information for other purposes, such as planning
budgets, but it provides no basis for changing incarceration rates. Stated this
way, the retributive objection does not really provide room for compromise
with Abrams' approach; there is no way to adjust the CBA to accommodate
it.
But many readers might, instead, have a softer objection. Traditionally,
judges are told to consider retribution and utilitarian objectives of
punishment when they choose sentences-even though it is not obvious how
these should combine to produce a single "right" sentences1 Likewise, every
first-year law student learns that both types of concern are pervasive in
criminal justice policymaking. For instance, when legislatures set the
statutory ranges for crimes, they presumably consider, at least implicitly,
whether the punishment is fair as well as whether it will accomplish practical
objectives. When analyzing the net benefits of pursuing a particular policy,
then, is there not some way to incorporate retributive concerns?
In briefly discussing this question, I intend neither to defend a single
answer to it nor to offer any novel insights on punishment theory. Rather, I
wish merely to point to a few possible ways that different takes on

29. HarryJ. Holzer et al., The Economic Costs of Poverty in the United States: Subsequent Effects of
Children Growing Up Poor 1 (Nat'1 Poverty Ctr., Working Paper No. 07-04, 2007), available at
http://www.npc.umich.edu/publications/u/working-papero7-o 4 .pdf.
30.

Id. at 17-20, 23-24.

31.

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C § 3553 (2012).
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punishment theory might lead us to think about the relationship between
CBA and retributive justice.
(1) Negative retributivism. One variant on retributive theory considers
moral desert to be a necessary prerequisite for punishment, but does not hold
that it renders punishment morally obligatory. Under this view,
considerations of social benefits and costs can affect the decision of whether
to punish a person who deserves it.3 Under this approach, Abrams' CBA
need not be adjusted to incorporate any retribution-related considerations.
Rather, it is the second step in an analysis of whether a given punishment
(or sentencing law) is appropriate; the first step is whether it is morally
deserved.
(2) Choice within a range. Another possibility is that moral desert does
necessitate proportional punishment, but that there is no single "correct"
sentence for each crime, or at least none that society is able to agree on. The
translation of the evil of a crime into a proportional length of incarceration
involves the comparison of incommensurate values, and is inherently
subjective. If, however, reasonable agreement could be reached as to the
range of possible sentencing rules that would be proportionate for a given
crime, perhaps CBA could help policymakers to choose among their
permissible options.33 This conception again does not require any changes
to Abrams' CBA; it is again the second step in the policy analysis, after the
range of permissible rules is determined by reference to the proportionality
principle.
(3) Excluding the defendant's costs. Another possibility is that retributive
concerns ought to influence the way we weigh certain costs of
incarceration-in particular, the costs to the defendant. After all,
punishment involves the deliberate infliction of suffering on the defendant.
If the defendant deserves to suffer, then retributive theory tells us that
inflicting this harm on him is a moral good, not an evil. But in that case,
perhaps the defendant's lost "value of freedom" does not belong on the
"cost" side of the CBA ledger. These costs might be appropriate to include
to the extent that they exceed what is morally deserved, but in such cases the
problem with the punishment from a retributive perspective is more acute:
an excessive punishment should simply not be given, regardless of its other
costs and benefits.

32.

This view is most prominently associated

with H.L.A. Hart. See H.L.A. Hart,

PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 233-37

(1968); see also

John Bronsteen, Retribution's Role, 84 IND. L.J. 1129, 1149-53 (2oo9); J.L. Mackie, Morality and
the Retributive Emotions, 1 CRIM.JUST. ETHICS 3, 4 (1982).
33.
This theory is similar to the "limiting retributivism" advanced by Norval Morris,
although he argued for allowing judges to choose within the retributively grounded constraints
set by the legislature. See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Principlesin Theory and Practice,2 2 CRIME &
JUST. 363, 366-74 (1997) (concisely summarizing Morris's theory).
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(4) Valuing society's taste for punishment. Another option is to treat the
public's retributively grounded preference for punishment as a term on the
"benefits" side of the model. To help to quantify this term, one could, for
instance, refer to experiments in psychology and behavioral economics that
demonstrate people's willingness to spend money in order to punish those
who have wronged them in a game.34 Note that this approach is not
philosophically consistent with retributivism. It is essentially forward-looking,
not backward-looking; it is indifferent to whether the public's taste for
punishment is appropriately grounded in the defendant's moral desert; and
it treats retributive concerns as merely one social benefit that can readily be
outweighed by competing interests. But from a purely utilitarian perspective,
like Abrams', it may make sense to incorporate this term; if people care
about it, then perhaps it should be weighed as a social good. Including this
term is consistent with keeping the defendant's cost term on the other side of
the balance-from a utilitarian perspective, the defendant's interests and
those of society all count.
(5) CBA as a measurement of society's revealed preference for punishment.
Another possibility, briefly suggested by Abrams himself, is to treat what we
spend on incarceration as a measure of how much Americans value
punishment of those who deserve it.35 More precisely, our revealed
preference for punishment is reflected by the extent to which the costs we
are willing to accept exceed the expected concrete benefits. If so, CBA could
be used to estimate the magnitude of that preference. Personally, however I
am skeptical of the extent to which CBA can really reveal Americans'
preferences as a descriptive matter. After all, the assumption would have to
be that the public widely understands the magnitudes of the various terms in
the equation, and given that empirical researchers have struggled to
estimate them, this seems unlikely. In addition, the approach in effect
assumes that current incarceration policy is rational and perfectly justified,
such that the apparent costs must be balanced out by a punishmentpreference benefit. I am, suffice it to say, skeptical that such an assumption
of rationality is justified.
IV. CONCLUSION

CBA is not, to be sure, an easy solution to the many difficult challenges
of criminal justice policy. Just as regulatory policy does-indeed, perhaps
even more so, given the significance of retributive concerns-punishment
choices involve subjective normative judgments, rather than merely

34.

See, e.g., Arinin Falk, Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Driving Forces Behind Informal

Sanctions, 73 ECONOMETRICA 2017, 2017-19 (2005). Note that it would be important to rely on

experiments designed to exclude the possibility that the reason people choose to punish is for
non-retributive purposes, such as deterrence; otherwise the "taste for punishment" term would
be redundant with other terms in the CBA.
35.

Abrams, supra note i, at911.
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problems of empirical estimation. In addition, even if one focuses only on
forward-looking considerations rather than moral desert, CBA (at least as
Abrams frames it) does not account for distributive concerns that
policymakers might also want to consider-it simply aggregates net social
costs and benefits, with no concern for who experiences those costs and
benefits.s6 This limitation is particularly acute in the criminal justice context:
incarceration imposes intense costs on the (relatively) few in order to
benefit the many, and the few are drawn principally from already
disadvantaged groups.37 These problems, combined with the serious
difficulties involved in obtaining accurate and precise empirical estimates,
are serious limitations to the practical value of CBA in this context.
Despite these drawbacks, it is very possible that the incorporation of
CBA (perhaps with modifications, as suggested above) would substantially
improve legislative decision-making about criminal punishment. The CBA
would not necessarily answer the question whether incarceration is justified,
but it could help to inform an inquiry that too often has been deeply illinformed. After all, political decision-making about incarceration policy has
for decades been characterized by ever-upward ratcheting, often with little
analysis of net costs and benefits, little serious discussion of the
proportionality of punishment, and little regard for distributive
consequences. Abrams' article is obviously not a definitive solution to the
challenges of incarceration policy, but it does not purport to be. What it
does do is provide a set of insights that, even if his approach is not adopted
wholesale, should be quite useful to policymakers and to scholars who are
interested in thinking more rigorously about whether and when
incarceration benefits society.

36.

See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, io6
(2oo6) (discussing the need to expand or adjust regulatory
CBA to account for distributive consequences).
COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1324-29

Some of those experiencing the costs are those who have committed crimes (such that
37.
moral desert considerations might weigh in the opposite direction of distributive
considerations), but others are innocent, such as the prisoner's family members.

